| Two years after being recognized as the 1988 Nobel Laureate in Medicine, Sir James Black was asked by a reporter for a national newspaper in England to share his opinions on the evolution of scientific inquiry. He reportedly said that we could expect to witness: "The progressive triumph of physiology over molecular biology." Regrettably, eleven years later, Werner Lowenstein published a book that attempts to do the exact opposite. Lowenstein makes it crystal clear that no signs of progress toward such a triumph of physiology over molecular biology will ever be found in his work. In his response to the reporter, Sir James reflected the view that physiology is the same basic science as the "physis" studied by Hippocrates and his colleagues--a non-linear science of great complexity, not reducible to linear concepts or terms such as those now prevalent in molecular biology--concepts and terms that have been derived from Newtonian physics and Cartesian dualism, and now from contemporary information theory. Consider the observations published in 1993 by F. Eugene Yates, Professor Emeritus of the Department of Medicine at the University of California, Los Angeles: "Physics is about simple beings and becomings, characterized by uniformity and generality: all electrons in the universe are alike; there are few kinds of quarks and only four basic forces--perhaps only one. Biology, in contrast, presents diversity and specialness of form and function, and sometimes a striking localness of distribution of its objects. Biological systems are complex by any definition of the term. Physics is a strongly reductionistic science, and has prospered in that style; but conceptually biological sciences now suffer from permeation by a mechanistic reductionism in the guise of two limiting and inappropriate metaphors: (1) the dynamic metaphor of organisms as machines and (2) the 'information' metaphor, of life as a text written on DNA. ...[B]oth metaphors are false and destructive of conceptual advances in the fundamental understanding of complex living systems that self-organize, grow, develop, adapt, reproduce, repair and maintain form and function, age, and die. ...Physicists make the Assumption of Simplicity--that in spite of the mathematical and other complications that may veil our vision, Nature is simple, both in composition of material objects and in rules for change. Biologists, on the other hand, take complexity as a given for the systems of interest to them. Although there is no universal agreement as to what constitutes a complex system, at the heart of the concept is some kind of non-reducibility--the behaviour we are interested in evaporates when we try to reduce the system to a simpler, better understood one (Stein 1989; Yates 1993). Furthermore, biological systems are inherently, fundamentally, and profoundly non-linear. ...The physical basis of life involves at least six attributes of non-linearity, broken symmetry, dissipation of free energy, complexity, orderly disorder, and marginal dynamic stability. Perhaps these attributes collectively constitute a sufficiently unique set to justify considering living systems as a fourth state of matter." (Logic of Life, pp.189-206). (Emphasis is in the original). Yates has provided us with a good list of examples of the vast and pivotal differences between diametrically opposite ways of looking at nature and of thinking about the most complex natural organism yet to evolve, the human body with its "unique set" of attributes,--that is, the organismic way, or the mechanistic, deterministic, and reductionistic way: "Living systems are predominantly not state-determined Living systems are predominantly not DNA-determined Living systems are predominantly not structurally stable Living systems are predominantly not far-from- equilibrium Living systems are predominantly not highly ordered or 'negentropic' Living systems are predominantly not far from noise communicationally Living systems are predominantly not program driven Living systems are predominantly not digital-computational" In direct contradiction to Yates's trenchant examples of the processive attributes of human organisms, Lowenstein's thinking rests upon an "assumption of simplicity," and thus on an unbelievable notion that human bodies are structurally stable; are DNA-determined; are program driven; and are digital-computational. At cellular and molecular levels, the language of intercellular and intracellular recognition and communication processes is written in carbohydrates, sugars. One will look in vain to find either term in Lowenstein's Index. Carbohydrates are complex, far more complex than proteins, therefore let us speak of proteins and ignore the crucial, sine qua non role and function of eight or more sugars in cell-to-cell communication. The following words of Robert Rosen are relevant to the point at issue: "If somatically an organism is a machine to be understood in purely syntactic, reductionistic terms, then life is only a matter of putting its fractions back together. But as we all know, it is literally not that simple. ...No (finite) concatenation of syntactic models of an organism yields something which must be an organism. ...Organisms are not in this class of systems. ...Just as we cannot concatenate syntactic models to obtain an organism, we cannot, for that same reason, concatenate reductionistic fractions to get an organism. ...Something else is needed to characterize what is alive from what is complex. Rachevsky provided this in his idea that biology was relational, and that relational meant (as we stated it) throwing away the physics and keeping the organization. Organization in its turn inherently involves functions and their interrelations; the abandonment of fractionability, however, means that there is no kind of 1 to 1 relationship between such relational, functional organizations and the structures that realize them. These are the basic differences between organisms and mechanisms or machines." (Logic of Life, p.213). Lowenstein evidently wants to keep the reductionistic physics and ignore the complexity of organismic organization, as the only means possible to buttress an assumption that human bodies really are simple. In my judgment, Werner Lowenstein is as far from defining the "touchstone of life" as it is possible for a thinker to be. |