| This is an important book, though flawed. Deutsch describes four "strands" in modern science: the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, evolution as advanced by Dawkins (who wrote The Selfish Gene), the new scientific method as expounded by a guy named Karl Popper, and the "Turing Principle", related to computation. The two strands that are at all interesting are MWI and evolution. The others are garbage, as far as I'm concerned. I found it extremely frustrating that he kept bringing them in as the established theories of major branches of science. For example, when introducing the Popperian theory of how knowledge is acquired, he first erects an elaborate straw-man concept of inductivism, and then smashes it down. In his straw-man, there are obvious flaws. His "Turing principle" is equally ridiculous. He continually focuses on the idea of virtual reality in his book, but I'm not sure why. It's not as if virtual reality can actually tell us anything about real reality, but he wants us to think that it can. Nevertheless, there were, as I said, important things in this book. The first is the best defense I've read so far of MWI. In the preface (p. ix), he writes Our best theories are not only truer than common sense, they make far more sense than common sense does. In Chapter 1, The Theory of Everything, he begins to harp on the great Errors that he continually mentions throughout the book, including instrumentalism, positivism and reductionism. Deutsch loves to complain about reductionists, although I simply cannot see what it is that he's trying to say. I agree much more with Steven Weinberg on this point (see Dreams of a Final Theory). In chapter 3 he spends a huge amount of text tearing down the philosophy of solipsism, which he defines as "the theory that only one mind exists and that what appears to be external reality is only a dream taking place in that mind". When introducing his scientific method according to Popper, which he elevates to epistemology, he says In science the object of the exercise is not to find a theory that will, or is likely to, be deemed true forever; it is to find the best theory available now. Baloney! I'm sure that the average theoretician would love to come up with a theory that would be deemed true, and would continue to be deemed true forever. Also in chapter 3 he does draw an important parallel between the evolution of scientific theories and biological evolution. From chapter 5 (or 6): The laws of physics, by conforming to the Turing principle, make it physically possible for those same laws to become known to physical objects. This is a good conclusion, and profound. This reminds me of that quote "the stars have made eyes with which to admire themselves". It echos the fundamental requirement that consciousness be somewhat self-referential. In Chapter 8, he talks about his "fourth strand", evolution. He makes the point that life is a fundamental property of nature. He describes a concept of replicators, which are things that cause copies of themselves to be made when they interact with a specific environment. Genes are replicators, but organisms are not. Organisms aren't, because the copies that are made are not exact duplicates. In chapter 9 he talks about quantum computers, and its pretty interesting. This is his field, after all. In chapter 10 he tries to make the point that our knowledge about mathematics is only as sound as our knowledge of physics - that they are on the same level. The only propositions that logic can prove without recourse to assumptions are tautologies - statements such as "all planets are planets", which assert nothing. Well, no one, to my knowledge, ever claims that mathematics can prove things without recourse to assumptions. Indeed, all of mathematics can be derived from sets of axioms, which really make the entire structure the same as a tautology. In other words, if our axioms are given by the statements A, B, and C, then every statement in mathematics is a sort of tautology of the form: If A, B, and C, then D. In chapter 11, he talks about time. He does a good job correcting the error of most people's conception that "time flows", that there is some "external time" with respect to which you can see our time flowing. This error shows up in science fiction stories and movies that feature time travel. Often there is some time limit on the travelers, even though they are bouncing back and forth between different world times. "Time Cops" and "Bill and Ted's Excellent Adventure" come to mind. But he's wrong that time doesn't flow. It flows at a rate of exactly one second per second. And he even makes the same mistake in the following quote: To exist at a particular moment means to exist there forever. "Forever" means "for all time", doesn't it? This I like, and I need to explore further: he says (p. 278): Other times are just special cases of other universes In chapter 12 he talks about time travel. He says that it is logically consistent with MWI, and I agree. In chapter 14 he talks a bit about Tipler's The Physics of Immortality. He makes the same error as Tipler when discussing the possibility that the Omega Point will resurrect us. If that is so, then why aren't we "transported" to that existence "right now"? I mean, presumably the Omega Point could reproduce our state at every moment in our lives, including this one. The fact is, that we are "inside the Omega Point" right now, and we're not! |