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Kenan Malik
Simon McLeish

John Searle

Mind, Language and Society

Philosophy, and in particular the philosophy of mind, can be a difficult area for those not used to the ways of philosophers. In Mind, Language and Society:Philosophy in the real word John Searle gives a readable discussion of realism, consciousness, society and language, explaining why others seem to tie themselves in knots about such issues.

The book has six chapters. The first looks at realism - Searle believes that there is a real world out there. This is followed by three chapters on the nature of the mind and consciousness - the biology of the brain, the structure of consciousness, and the nature of intentionality. The penultimate chapter looks at society, and at how social institutions, such as money, get their meaning. The final chapter looks at the particular social institution of language.

I'm not entirely convinced about the way Searle deals with the 'hard' problem of consciousness. His view is that the division into the competing possibilities of materialism/dualism/epiphenomenalism/idealism just isn't the right way to look at it. There may well be something in this, but to me it looks a bit like sidestepping the issue. Searle also seems to be avoiding some of the awkward questions of what it would mean for a machine to be conscious. So I don't agree with everything which Searle has to say, but I did feel that this conscise book does introduce some of the important issues in philosophy, and gives the reader some insightful ideas on how these issues might be dealt with.

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Paperback 192 pages  
ISBN: 0465045219
Salesrank: 445203
Weight:0.35 lbs
Published: 2000 Basic Books
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Paperback 192 pages  
ISBN: 0465045219
Salesrank: 445624
Weight:0.35 lbs
Published: 1999 Basic Books
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Paperback 192 pages  
ISBN: 0465045219
Salesrank: 136976
Weight:0.35 lbs
Published: 1999 Basic Books
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Product Description
Disillusionment with psychology is leading more and more people to formal philosophy for clues about how to think about life. But most of us who try to grapple with concepts such as reality, truth, common sense, consciousness, and society lack the rigorous training to discuss them with any confidence. John Searle brings these notions down from their abstract heights to the terra firma of real-world understanding, so that those with no knowledge of philosophy can understand how these principles play out in our everyday lives. The author stresses that there is a real world out there to deal with, and condemns the belief that the reality of our world is dependent on our perception of it.
 
Most of the criticisms are apt, but ****
...I like it anyway. I just really like John Searle's personality. Yes, he's smug, yes, despite being sloppy, yes, almost surely he sets up straw men quite regularly, and yes, he would definitely sneer at anyone who argued with him. If you disagree with Searle, probably you won't like him very much and if you do agree, you should probably be careful to check whether or not you like him because he's convincing or because he's reassuring. I just really like reading his books and articles for their vast power to entertain.

Chapter 1 is essentially an attack on post-modern nonsense. One of the things I love about Searle is that (like Carl Sagan, perhaps) he's interested in bringing down views that he deems preposterous, and can we argue that this isn't at least a little bit fun? One of my favorite books about the post-modern is "Signs of the Times: Deconstruction and the Fall of Paul De Man" by David Lehman. Next to Lehman, Searle is downright respectful of the opposition...though to be honest I judge Lehman's approach to be far more along the lines of what is deserved. Chapter 2 begins with a similar treatment of those in analytic philosophy who would embrace dualism or materialism. For about 50 pages, he's convincing, indeed moving in spots. Unfortunately, he sets the problem up far better than he "resolves" it. Indeed, for about 15 pages he blathers on about how consciousness is just "a biological phenomenon like any other" (only not like any other), and how once we realize this we won't be troubled by materialism, dualism, the threat of epiphenomenalism etc. I don't think there's an argument there anywhere, and certainly no one could be convinced or more probably even figure out what he means. However he does at least pause to "wrinkle his nose" at any approach that ignores natural selection (most writers on the mind-body problem avoid this entirely, which is almost surely catastrophic for their views), which I applaud. From there it's on to intentionality, social reality, language etc. in a similar vein.

Ultimately, the value of John Searle as a philosopher is not in any arguments he comes up with, but in the fact that his intuitions are extremely good--he almost always comes down on the right side of the fence. In short, he follows his nose, with an uncanny aptitude for finding what's most apt to wrinkle it at. More importantly, he's not afraid to do so, which I for one find damn refreshing.
 
Searle Summarized ****
In this short, readable book, John Searle gives an account of how minds, language, and social institutions are situated within a material universe. The account goes roughly like this: consciousness is a biological phenomena; conscious minds exhibit intentionality (i.e., the ability to refer to or "fit" the external world); and intentionality allows human minds to create social institutions and vest meaning in words. Searle transcends standard materialist and dualist positions in philosophy. He insists that mental, social, and linguistic phenomena must be explained in natural terms, but he does not try to "reduce" them to other categories or "explain" them out of existence. Along the way, he discusses a variety of issues ranging from realism to philosophical method.

A professor at UC Berkeley, Searle has a genius for cutting to the heart of a philosophical position and keeping his concepts tied to reality and common experience. He also writes so well that it's hard not to be carried along by his argument. At the same time, I never really bought his argument that consciousness is a purely biological category, especially after he conceded that "first person" conscious experiences cannot be reduced to "third person" facts about brains. Nor did I understand his account of how consciouness operates as a "macro" feature of the brain able to cause effects in "micro" features such as neurons. He draws an analogy with an automobile engine, where macro-features such as pistons and spark plugs have causal effects even though everything in the engine obeys the laws of subatomic physics. Unfortunately, the analogy doesn't convince: whatever else consciousness is, it doesn't seem to function like a piston. Searle blames our inability to see the force of his analogy on our cramped intuitions about causation. He doesn't provide any alternative intuitions.

It seems undeniable that conscious experience is constructed by material brains -- anyone who doubts this should read a few clinical essays by Oliver Sacks or A. R. Luria that describe the deformed consciousness of brain-injured patients. However, the mind also exhibits so many non-physical features that fitting it into "nature" may be harder than Searle lets on. The puzzle isn't solved -- just restated -- by insisting, "The mind is OBVIOUSLY real (so materialism is false), the mind is OBVIOUSLY part of the brain (so dualism is false), the mind OBVIOUSLY can cause effects in the brain (so epiphenomenalism is false)," and so forth. Maybe Searle is right that materialism and dualism are outmoded categories. Even so, consciousness is such a peculiar biological phenomenon, and so totally unlike any other process or feature of our bodies, that dualistic philosophies will inevitably emerge to account for it -- and will, in turn, spawn materialistic counter-philosophies aimed at resolving the paradoxes of dualism. The dualism/materialism debate may be sterile, but I doubt that Searle has brought it to an end.

None of these remarks should be taken as serious criticism of "Mind, Language, and Society," which covers a lot of ground beside the mind/body question. In only 150 pages or so, the book summarizes work Searle has published over the years in modern classics such as "The Rediscovery of the Mind," "Intentionality," and "The Construction of Social Reality." (In fact, I recall that Searle presented some of this material in undergraduate courses at Berkeley in the late 1970s.) Even though Searle doesn't discuss the free will problem or give equal time to opposing positions, his book is first-rate, and I definitely want to read it a second time. Anyone who has already taken a few introductory classes in philosophy and wants to probe deeper into the subject would benefit from reading it.




 
Searle is no scientist. **
In this book Searle takes on the broad topics of scientific realism, the mind-body problem and the puzzle of socially constructed concepts (e.g. money), among other things. His goal seems to be to defend the "common sense" view on these topics, but as a philosopher he wants to do so rigorously. In this case, "rigorous" means mixing lots of specialized terminology with an otherwise breezy style, which has the overall effect of making him sound smug. His is a rare style that manages to convey that the author would sneer at any counterarguments to his positions; maybe this is because he stakes out his ground almost wholly by attacking the positions of others and deeming them obviously wrong.

What's worse, despite his fantastic reputation, his philosophy seems really sloppy to me. For example, he claims that "consciousness" is a definite non-physical property of the brain that has evolved. Then, he argues against epiphenomenalism by noting how implausible it would be that something so useful evolved while making no real difference. Seeing as how evolution is a physical theory, Searle seems to be arguing in circles. And that's about how the whole book is, seeing as how you have to buy into his mind-body "resolution" before you can even start pondering his ideas on the other stuff.

So, if you feel that invoking "the way it is like" to drink a glass of wine is a good philosophical argument for consciousness being non-physical and are already dead-certain that rocks have no such sensations, the you might find this book a reassuring read.

Personally, I think that to understand a proposition you have to also understand its negation. And while Searle claims to be an expert at characterizing what it is to be conscious, I have a hard time taking any of his "analysis" seriously, since he surely can't explain to me what it's like to be unconscious.

For those with a scientific bent, there are better authors out there covering similar material. In particular, I recommend "Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience", by Max Bennet and PMS Hacker. Hacker makes sure the philosophy is reasonable, Bennet makes sure the science is accurate. Searle's book falls a little shy in both areas, which makes his smuggness all the more infuriating.
 
Excellent and Unorthodox Introduction to Philosophy *****
I'd like to note, first of all, that I didn't find Searle as uncharitable as some of the other reviewers here. He did give a few low blows, but I think his arguments appeared as straw-man's because rather than refute a lot of the other claims, he was integrating them subtly: dropping off parts which were unnecessary and then using the leftovers to create a greater and more encompassing theory. He never goes into depth of why he finds the parts of theories credible that he does, as this book is not intended for deep analysis. The reader must simply take Searle's word for it at times to understand what he is getting at (Searle does provide a nice "Further Reading" section at the end for readers who are more interested in the "why's" behind his arguments).

Which leads me into the content of his book...

This book is a modern introduction to more recent philosophical issues. Searle sums up in the first chapter most of the out-standing problems in the field that remain unsolved from the last few hundred years. These include the mind-body problem, skepticism, realism, and issues relating to consciousness such as binding and intentionality. Searle has an interesting perspective in that he tries to alleviate conflicts by "going behind the issue and merging premises." With this method he finds complete theories that integrate many perspectives that before seemed contradictory.

The writing of this book is not as thick as his other works. Most of his language is quite precise and his arguments are logically spelled out. The analogies are simple for easy understanding; more advanced readers will probably want to contemplate further implications of Searle's ideas than he discusses.

Searle is yet another voice in the last few decades that has shown a tendency towards integration to solve logical issues. This seems to be a trend with many other authors, and might be called the "leading edge" of philosophical thought right now. The book takes the reader from step one, and slowly builds up a view of reality that integrates mind, society, and language exquisitely.

And if you happen to be a proponent of one of the many theories Searle disagrees with, try to be patient, and see where he's going. He does use a condescending tone now and then. But other than that, recommended...
 
Interesting, but Uncharitably Written ***
Ever since I read "The Construction of Social Reality" I have admired Searle. Yet, after reading this work I am left with a foul aftertatse that i can't shake off.

Essentially, Searle is presenting a summary package of his overall philosophy and, in doing so, is also writing a sort of "introduction to philosophy" type book, where he will take the reader through the various problems of philosophy. However, he does a disservice to the uniformed reader by seriously underrepresenting his opponent's arguments. I'm not sure if he does this simply because he is writing to a more elementary reader and, thus, feels justified in brushing off the "hard" philosophical positions by using words like "preposterous" to characteristically push them to the periphery, but this is a common tactic in this book. In the very first chapter Searle classifies the "default positions" that the "common man" will undoubtedly take for granted in every day life. These are positions like naive realism, the correspondance view of truth, the referential theory of meaning, etc. He then states that it is his intention to defend these doctrines, which is fine, but he also is very upfront about his presupposition that denying any of these doctrines is obviously absurd. While in the end I'm sure it matters very little, there is still an air of unsportsman-like conduct festering in Searle's writing. Searle should know better than to commit the strawman fallacy, even if he is writing a more elementary text. It can misrepresent some serious challenges that "ought" to be given serious attention to the average reader. After reading Searle's book, one might mistakenly think that these matters are pretty much settled.

It is still an interesting read, but if this is one of your first reads as a student of philosophy I encourage you delve deeper into the issues Searle has addressed.

 
Archaic thought repeating old wisdom *
This book is subtitled 'Philosophy in the Real World'. This is inaccurate. The real world and ultimate reality, according to Searle, is the world of physics and chemistry and the fields and forces of nature. With his mind made up from the start, this is not philosophy (which would not take such a dogmatic position) but a theory of consciousness according to science.
This is fine if it is what we have come to expect from science, but a tragedy if it represents the philosophical position. It may be that philosophy has succumbed to the pressure and become absorbed into the service of science, but this view of consciousness is notable for its etiolated view of reality, excluding much that is fundamental to an understanding of it.
From its own standpoint as a piece of work concerned with the workings of the mind, it is reasonably clear as far as it goes, and does not say anything that is new or radical when considered alongside the mass of literature that already surrounds it. However, it feigns difference with other writers such as Daniel Dennett since they are more or less of one accord with basic assumptions, or default positions as Searle calls them.
The reason I say this is simple enough. It is odd to hear so much concerning the nature of consciousness, and yet never a reference to death.
There is a simple reason why this is significant. In the absence of death, we would not need to reproduce. In the absence of that, there would be no need to experience desire. Yet the closest Searle manages to get to this is by the metaphor of digestion and the usual comparisons with motor cars.
Of course, desire and consciousness are not the same thing, but the question is, could one arise or emerge without the other. If not, then the presence of death in each molecule of us has an active function, even though it is unconscious.
But these are the real philosophical issues and the fact that they get no mention at all is very worrying. Consciousness is turned into a phenomena like any other inert process that has all reference to death stripped out of it to make it scientifically amenable. Out of this one gets a sense that science is not so much concerned with the nature of reality, but a reality that does not need to consider the concept of death as an activity, which is more illusory than the delusions Searle points out are unreal (such as the experience of being in love).
To discuss consciousness without death as part of its content is virtually a hollow pursuit, for no matter how many properties one may find in it, one is eventually forced to talk of nothing more than brain processes and bio-mechanisms. Such study provides insight that may help in the treatment of brain-damaged patients etc, but this usefulness should not be read as a synonym for understanding, unless we equate philosophy with a kind of science-waiting-in-the-wings. Certainly there are many types of consciousness, and different forms of intention etc, but we should not be fooled into thinking this to be philosophy in the real world, and it does not move our understanding forward by an inch, simply because we have identified many such states. No, this is not philosophy in the real world, but science in an idealised form in a world that is deathless.
 
Solid Philosophical Analysis ****
As a student of philosophy, I found, first of all, Searle's methodological approach to philosophical analysis and conceptual mapping very helpful. The clarity, rigor, and logical structure that Searle writes with are to be admired. For anyone looking for well-done and well-written philosophy text, this is certainly a book to consult.

Although I am not sympathetic to analytic philosophy and its problems, this book deserves to be read and thought through. Furthermore, even though this book was intended to scratch the surface of conscienceness, language, etc., it is certainly not lacking in rigor.

Finally, Searle has an interesting philosophical tool to analyzing philosophical problems: he attempts to get past the dominant and current categorization of problems (for example, materialism and dualism when talking about the mind and constitution) and form his own way of talking about the problem (and thus forming his own category). I am not sure if the methodological approach is of any help (because it just creates another category). But I will say that his break with the traditional notions of dualism and materialism is helpful and rather thought provoking.

My one question: Even though Searle attempts to get past these traditional categories in thinking about the mind and its structure, I think that, even though he says he does not, he has a prior commitment to a naturalistic worldview. If so, fine. I just wish he was explicit. If not, then what is he?

Great book. Read it and enjoy. Simply put: this is great philosophy and done very well.

 
I am not sure I understand what all the praise is for... **
In my mind the most unforgivable "sin" a philosopher can commit is the straw man fallacy, that is, accusing your opponents of holding positions they don't really hold and then proceeding to refute those points of view as a support for building your own positive position. The second most unforgivable "sin" is to do all of this in a not-very-polite way. In this book Mr. Searle is guilty of both of these sins. In the opening pages of the book Mr. Searle says he has three objectives in writing: (1) to advance a series of claims about mind, language, and society; (2) to exemplify a certain style of philosophical analysis; (3) a series of passing observations about thenature of philosophical puzzlement. Surprisingly Mr. Searle says very little about his own positive claims, although one would assume that to really understand his claims, we need to look at his other books. As for objective two, his "style" is somewhat the opposite of objective and rational: his "dialectic" consists of an attack on opponents - one which occasionally borders on ad hominem vitriol - followed by a passing positive affirmation of his own claims; the third objective is really just a thinly veiled revelation that Mr. Searle has axes to grind and may be inclined to pause and grind his axes spontaneously and without warning.

In regards to objective 2, Mr. Searle's methodology seems to consist of a mockery of opponents and an exhuberant, emotionally charged language (time and again Mr. Searle tells us how "embarrassed" he is for his opponents for holding such "obviously" wrong positions) combined with purposeful "straw man" style distortions and misrepresentations of diverse sets of opponents under collective rhubrics (such as that "idealists" like Hegel, Rorty, Kuhn and Derrida (!?!) deny the existence of a real world); to me this is hardly what can be called a "refutation." Further, I fail to see, even after all of Mr. Searle's effort, how an alleged refutation of one's opponents constitutes a successful defense on one's own positive claims.

It is one thing if Mr. Searle simply were guilty of misunderstanding some of his opponents. But Mr. Searle's style is so incredibly arrogant, so incredibly self-assured and aggressive in its mockery of others ("feeble" is a favorite adjective he uses over and over again to describe his opponents' arguments), that I am left feeling rather impatient to find the diamond in the rough of Mr. Searle's writing. I don't mean to say that his ideas don't have substance, but rather that it is so difficult to seperate the substance from the vitriol that one quickly loses patience and may be inclined to seek philosophical substance elsewhere.

 
Where Searle should be ****
For anyone familiar with contemporary analytical philosophy, they will indubitably recognize the name John Searle. Well known for taking up the Speech Act project started by the late Oxford philosopher J.L. Austin, Searle has found his niche in Mind, Language and Society: a clear and concise presentation that brings complex philosophical issues from the Ivory Tower to the casual reader (the Real World?).

This book is a very good "intermediate" philosophical text for the younger student interested in getting a more in depth look at some the many major problems that have always perplexed philosophers -- skepticism, the mind-body problem, intentionality and consciousness -- but Searle also places these issues into his own philosophical project -- a "re-invention" of enlightenment philosophy and the cartesian theatre of the mind.

I would not recommend, as others have, of using this book as a source for advanced philosophical research. Searle's other texts and papers like *Intentionality* and *Speech Acts* take these discussions a few steps further in thier analytic analysis. Also, the endnoting used in the book is not very practical for those of us who follow footnotes as crucial elements of a discussion.

All in all, however, this book is a excellent achievement of transparent style and presentation.

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