Freedom Evolves

Yes, I'm being a little ironic. But, for the most part, I'm a buyer: Dennett's books are certainly fascinating, and in large part compelling, and this one is no exception.

Just as there are similar strands between Consciousness Explained and Darwin's Dangerous Idea, there are some very familiar concepts here - old hands will recognise Conway's life world, the Prisoner's Dilemma, and Benjamin Libet's experiment which (seemed to) describe a "missing 300ms" between neural activity and consciousness of it - to the point where you might think to skip a few pages altogether.

This would be a mistake, however, for a reason which nicely complements Dennett's own "multiple drafts" theory of consciousness: repeated examination of the same ideas, in a new context, and with the benefit of a refined explanation, affords the reader new perspectives, and enhances comprehension of this book, but also the earlier ones. In the case of Libet's experiment, Dennett is much more compelling in his counterarguments than in Consciousness Explained - the revised draft gives a better view of the point.

What is so pleasing about all three books are the consistency of thoughts and ideas between them across what are at first glance disparate lines of inquiry - the unifying meta-theory here is Darwin's - applied in quite different (but clearly related) contexts. Dennett extends the application of his arguments to some economic and quasi-political situations - everyday life, to you and me, where these questions actually matter - and gets mostly the right results. (It never fails to amaze me how highly intelligent, extremely well educated, university professors in social sciences fail to grasp even the basic tenets of economic theory, so it is a welcome sign that one of their number might do, especially one who once publicly struggled with the Laffer curve)

I have two, related, complaints about Freedom Evolves. Of all the metaphysical conundrums, Free Will is - and ought to be - the least interesting, and most prone to catcalls from those in the cheap seats who think philosophy is wishy-washy, head-up-posterior, nonsense.

Where consciousness has profound practical implications for our understanding of the world and how to live in it (not least in the field of AI); and whether God exists or not has profound implications for our sense of morality, the free will debate has neither feature: we all think we are free to choose; as a brute fact either we are or we're not: but either way, we can't change it (if we're not free, then we aren't free to change to be free; if we are free, we're not free to decide not to be). Whatever the answer is, it can't make any difference to the way we live out our lives, since whether we're free to choose begs the very question we're asking.

That said, Dennett's Darwinian-influenced arguments are compelling in support of the case for free will.

What isn't so compelling is the small part of the book in which he allows metaphysics to tip over into ethics. For the second book in a row, Dennett has made some unwelcome noises about sketching out some sort of theory of moral objectivity. He doesn't dwell on it, as such, but it is definitely there: writing elliptically, I think Dennett attempts to make a case for a sort of Moral Objectivism to be derived from evolution. He says, as his book draws to a close:

"The philosopher's problem is to negotiate the transition from `is' to `ought', or more precisely to show how we might go beyond the `merely historical' fact that certain customs and policies have had, as a matter of fact, widespread societal endorsement, and get all the way to norms that command assent in all rational agents. Successful instances of this move are known. Bootstrapping has worked in the past, and it can work here as well. We don't need a skyhook."

I find this paragraph utterly baffling. It arrives so unannounced, and is so totally at odds with the very spirit and sense of everything else in Daniel Dennett's Darwin-influenced meta-theory, I just can't see what on earth possessed him to write it. What conceivable role could "norms commanding asset in all rational agents" in the gloriously unpredictable topography of the evolutionary journey possibly have?

Dennett compares this to the process of obtaining a (virtually) perfect straightedge over centuries by continually refining our technique for making straighter and straighter straightedges - apparently missing the point that in the case of the straightedge there is an immutable, single, unmistakable, universally understood abstract concept of a "perfectly straight line" which the manufactured straightedge is aiming to achieve; as such, it could scarcely be different to describing norms generally agreed amongst poorly defined (and constantly mutating) communities of individuals which have been developed unsystematically over time in reaction to drastically shifting environmental and societal factors to regulate the behaviour of a community which itself is moving randomly through design space (i.e., evolving).

Now, since when is transforming "is" to "ought" the philosopher's problem? Isn't the philosopher's job done when we can look at this wonderful model derived from Darwin's work, and say: Look, mum, no homunculus! No intelligent designer! No rules!

Having knocked off the three main metaphyiscal conundrums, you wonder what might be next on the agenda - "Right and Wrong: Finally Sorted" perhaps?

Olly Buxton

Dennett argues that "determinism" has suffered bad press. We need to recognize that many things are "determined" - gravity, sunlight, the way our body's cells unite to keep you operating. Determinism is simply the rules of the game of life. That doesn't mean that the rules fix every aspect of life. Various choices appear at different times at many levels. Does the gazelle flee right or left? Does a bird seek food at this tree or that one? How many of these choices are "conscious" and how many innate? Humans, as part of their cultural heritage, have tended to see only themselves as possessors of "free will." Dennett argues that there are too many levels and too many variations to take such an absolutist stance.

A long evolutionary trail operating within the "determined" world environment has led to us. Humans, to a large extent, have overcome the barriers of what is "determined," but we must be cautious in celebrating that triumph. We are neither wholly free nor biologically driven. It's too easy to slip from "fixed" circumstances into "fixed" behaviour, which Dennett brands a false assumption. He scorns the frequently levied charge that evolutionary roots for our behaviour must deny our ability to think. He's equally disdainful of those who argue that memes obscure our will. His section on memes and memetics as a science is among the best in print.

No discussion on will can skirt the issues of ethics and morals. There will be readers who will skip to Chapter 7, yet those are the people who will pause at its title: "The Evolution of Moral Agency." Dennett's wedges are aimed at such, and it's to be hoped they will read carefully, as we all should. Many preconceived notions are held up for close scrutiny and assessment. Those notions are held by Dennett's readers and his critics and he addresses them ably. If we possess free will, then we must use it - but we must exercise it from a knowledgeable base. We must consider the impact of our choices before we apply them. Dennett offers some practical examples, some of them jarring in their import, for you to consider. The examples are those dealt with daily by law and government. They confront you directly and, in a "free" society, you must make choices you can live with. Dennett, far more than the rest of the philosopher's guild, confronts you with these choices in a clear and open manner. There are no mysteries or metaphysics to unravel. Read this and see if you are making choices in a rational manner. How rational your choices are will be up to you to assess. [stephen a. haines - Ottawa, Canada]

that free will is an evolutionary adaptation
that indeterminism is not made possible by quantum mechanics
that decisions are processes taking place in the brain over space and time and therefore cannot be pin-pointed

but to me none of these theses are new or surprising, and I just don't see what took him so many pages to say what he said.

Mayr quotes Sewall Wright in "Toward a New Philosophy of Biology", p. 288, as saying "The Darwinian process of continued interplay of a random and a selective process is not intermediate between pure chance and pure determinism, but in its consequences utterly different from either." Thus, like the argument between nature and nurture, the issue of determinism vs. indeterminism is at least in part spurious. Given, however, that there is some reason to discuss this issue at all (it is certainly fascinating) it seems very reasonable that a man as eminently qualified as Daniel Dennett should write this book. Indeed, Dennett wrote an excellent exposition of the determinist view of evolution in "Darwin's Dangerous Idea."

I have a few bones to pick, however. On p. 25, Dennett uses Van Inwagen's definition for determinism as the thesis that "there is at any instant exactly one physically possible future." He goes on to state that determinism thus defined does not imply inevitability. However, most dictionaries state in their definitions that determinism precludes free will. Is Dennett here redefining the meaning of the word to allow himself the luxury of free will? To some extent he is- at least the commonly understood meaning. However, he does so at his peril because words can and do get people into trouble and his detractors have the same privilege!

The second bone is the statement by Dennett that he felt the need to write this book because he and his associates (among whom he lists Crick, Watson, Wilson, Dawkins, and Pinker) are often misunderstood and misquoted by colleagues who disagree with "genetic determinism." He may have a point about his colleagues (although they have said the same thing about him). He also notes that there have been "some unfortunate overstatements and over simplifications," which have made him and his associates targets (undoubtedly in part because of sensational headlines often associated with them.) Unfortunately, the press, most politicians, and much of the general public will never understand the nuances of the argument and some don't want to do so for their own reasons! Beside, some of the people he names as associates, or "responsible, cautious naturalists," as he calls them (such as Pinker, Dawkins and even Wilson) and other "genetic determinists" that he does not mention (perhaps these, such as Thornhill and Ruse, are irresponsible naturalists?) have made statements in interviews and in their publications that lend themselves directly to sensationalism and criticism by their peers. He also should not be too surprised that Derk Pereboom (2001) runs with the idea that we have no free will, given the "unfortunate overstatements" of his associates.

A third bone is that although Dennett does admit that some of the deterministic ideas can be misused he states that they should not be. However, deterministic ideas based on little solid experimental or historical evidence (such as Pinker's genetic basis for infanticide or Thornhill's male hardwiring for rape) should not be stated as fact, especially when scientists urge their use to set social policy. While Eldredge in his recent book (2004) does not believe that a researcher should hide the truth to avoid unpleasant realities, he does think that they have to be reasonably sure that the view is not a biased untruth. To paraphrase Mark Twain, it is not what you don't know that causes trouble; it is what you "know" that ain't true!

How does Dennett handle his main arguments (including one that quantum theory cannot save us from a deterministic universe)? Very well, but to me unconvincingly! To be fair he (among his associates I think a first) points out that hard determinists are faced with a serious dilemma, namely how to give themselves free will while denying it to others! Dennett also (correctly I think) points out the rather flawed idea of using labels, such as "genetic determinist." I wish Steven Pinker had been as careful about the "blank slate" idealists (environmental determinists)!

However, Dennett reinstates free will by (I think) a mechanistic slight of hand (I might add that this slight of hand could be how the universe works!) He dismisses quantum effects (I think the jury is still out on that one - perhaps Roger Penrose is wrong, but we shall see!) as weakening the ability to reach a free will decision and thus defeating the very process it seeks to validify. In essence, as near as I can tell, he reinstates free will as being a necessary byproduct of deterministic processes.

In closing, I think Dennett's book is well worth reading, despite my disagreements with him. Some of his arguments I feel unqualified to judge and in any case I may be wrong in my criticisms. He certainly brings up numerous interesting points and articulately defends his position. I remain, however, somewhat skeptical. After wading over the years through books by Dawkins, Ruse, Wilson, Gould, Eldredge, Lewontin, Pinker, Mayr, Williams, Barash, Diamond, Lorenz and Dennett (not to mention the more popular, but also more sensationalistic writers Ardrey and Morris) I am getting a bit tired of the debate. It has to some extent taken on the appearance of a group of clerics arguing over esoteric and obscure points of the Old Testament, with no end in sight!

Our point of view as living acting human beings is not the point of view of atoms or of gods and cannot be, need not be, and cannot even coherently be imagined to be. If you want to get that point across to an intelligent, scientifically inclined clinger to metaphysics, mysticism, or their lord Jesus Christ, this might be an ideal book to give them.

That said, I have some quibbles with Dennett's approach. He argues that an event can be determined but not inevitable, meaning not unavoidable (from the point of view of the agent involved), and he develops this point as something more than just a clever play on etymologies. But he goes on throughout the book to discuss free will in solely negative terms as the ability to avoid things. Why is there not one word on free will as the ability to create the new and unexpected? Why is there not even a comment on avoiding failing to be brilliant or heroic? In fact, Dennett uses forced confinement (as in a US prison cell) as an analogy for free will (we avoid child molestation by locking up people convicted of child molestation). Further, Dennett focuses part of his discussion of "intuitions" regarding free will on anger and resentment. Where in all of this is admiration, appreciation, self-satisfaction, gratification, or friendship?

Dennett leaves out much of what is valuable about free will. Those who object to his compatibilism may use this fact against him. I find compatibilism completely convincing but Dennett's view of life depressing.

Dennett clearly supports our habit of locking many people up in prisons, although he offers castration as a possible alternative for pedophiles. But, while protecting children from pedophiles may have something to do with the will power of former pedophiles trying to change, it ought to be seen as a separate issue from retribution for guilt grounded in freely willed criminal behavior.

If we are going to be advanced enough to drop metaphysics, we should also be advanced enough to make our handling of crime forward looking, focused on reconciliation and restitution. Dennett's fantasy about guilty individuals adopting a "Thanks I needed that" attitude toward punishment does not advance this project at all.

Also, let me add that I suspect that a not insubstantial number of reviewers espousing enthusiasm have misunderstood Dennett's views at least a little bit. Again, this is just good old compatibilism. If you found compatibilism hard to swallow back when you read Hume in your philosophy 101 class, you should probably find it equally hard to swallow here. (If you liked compatibilism back then, though, Dennett will give you some neat new ways to put your views.)